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WHEN WILL U.S. FIRMS BECOME MAJOR DAIRY EXPORTERS AND BIGGER DIRECT
INVESTORS IN FOREIGN DAIRY-FOOD BUSINESSES?
W. D. Dobson, Jeffrey Wagner, and Rodney Hintz*
Executive Summary
Introduction
·  Established in 1991, the Babcock Institute for International Dairy Research and Development
carries out studies on international dairy marketing and trade, and dairy science issues that have
international dimensions. As part of its programs, the Institute has conducted case studies
and/or industry studies in a dozen countries and has contributed financially to development of a
world dairy trade model.  This Discussion Paper draws insights from international marketing/
trade studies carried out by the Babcock Institute during the last decade.
·  This paper addresses the question posed in the title of the paper and presents implications for
U.S. firms, emphasizing the implications for U.S. foreign direct investment in dairy-food
businesses.
When Will U.S. Firms Become Major Dairy Exporters?
·  U.S. firms exported about $1.0 billion in dairy products in 1999.  In dollar value, dairy exports
in 1999 were equal to about 2.0% of the total value of U.S. agricultural exports.  In milk
equivalent terms, U.S. dairy exports in 1999 totaled about 8.0 billion pounds (equal to 4.9% of
U.S. milk production).
·  With a few prominent exceptions, the prospects for substantially expanded dairy exports by
U.S. firms are not bright for at least the current decade.  The exceptions relate to exports of
products such as dried whey, whey fractions, dairy blends, selected specialty dairy products
(specialty cheeses, premium ice cream, etc.), and nonfat dry milk (NFDM).  U.S. NFDM will
be exported mainly with the help of the USDA's  Dairy Export Incentive Program subsidies.
Mexico will be an important destination  for U.S. dairy exports.
·  U.S. dairy exports are low partly because U.S. market prices for major bulk dairy products
(cheddar cheese, butter and NFDM) are sharply higher (nearly 50% higher during 1990-2000)
than world prices.
·  U.S. prices of cheddar cheese, butter and NFDM are higher than world prices mainly because
of differences between U.S. and foreign supply-demand conditions, U.S. border protection and,
to a lesser extent, because of the USDA's dairy price support program.
·  Deregulation of the U.S. dairy industry would make bulk and partially differentiated dairy
products more competitive in international markets.  However, deregulation is unlikely—
especially unilateral deregulation by the U.S.  The uncertain benefits from expanded dairy
exports in a deregulated environment would occur in the future after substantial adjustment
pain.
·  The possible benefits of deregulation are unlikely to make politically-influential U.S. milk-
producer organizations clamor for deregulation and a bigger role for U.S. firms in the
international dairy trade.  Consumers and certain milk processors might favor deregulation but
are unlikely to wield the political power needed to produce such a result.
                                                
* W.D. Dobson is Professor of Agricultural & Applied Economics, Co-Director of the Babcock
Institute, and Director of the Renk Agribusiness Institute at the University of Wisconsin-Madison.
Jeffrey Wagner and Rodney Hintz were Project Assistants and MBA in Agribusiness students in the
School of Business at the University of Wisconsin-Madison when this study was conducted.  The
help of Ms. Anchallee Marutarulert, Project Assistant and MBA in Agribusiness student at the
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·  Maintaining the status quo will come at a cost for the U.S. dairy industry.  Thomas Suber,
Executive Director of the U.S. Dairy Export Council, hypothesized that U.S. dairy processors,
cooperatives, traders, and farmers face the future with the cold realism that either the U.S. dairy
industry  competes internationally or shrinks. Lack of incentives to export will also foster
interregional competitive pressures in the U.S. that may work to the disadvantage of the Upper
Midwest.
When Will U.S. Firms Become Bigger Investors in Foreign Dairy-Food Businesses?
·  While barriers to foreign direct investment by U.S. firms are less formidable than  barriers to
dairy exporting, U.S. firms have limited involvement in foreign direct investment in dairy-food
businesses. Kraft Foods is a prominent exception.  A few other firms, including Schreiber
Foods, also have a notable presence as foreign direct investors.
·  Many reasonable hypotheses can be advanced to explain the limited amount of foreign direct
investment by U.S. firms.  The U.S. market is large, familiar, mostly English speaking, and
largely devoid of corruption, making it attractive for U.S. businesses to serve.  In addition, many
small and mid-sized dairy firms may have concluded that foreign direct investment in dairy-
food businesses is a "big firm's game."
·  The heavy emphasis on domestic sales may limit profits of U.S. dairy food firms if, as claimed
by a former Nestle CEO, the U.S. and European dairy-food markets are "flat and fiercely
competitive."  The New Zealand Dairy Board-Global Dairy Company has also placed increased
emphasis on foreign direct investment because foreign markets remain less accessible than the
firm expected to dairy exports. This action by the largest of the private dairy exporters speaks
volumes about opportunities in dairy exporting vs. foreign direct investment.
·  The paper analyzes strategies of a cross section of firms (listed below) that have been
successfully involved in direct investment in foreign dairy-food businesses to identify strategies
that may be worth emulating by U.S. dairy food firms.
Firm Location of Headquarters
Arla Foods Aarhus, Denmark
Kerry Group/PLC Tralee, Ireland
Kraft Foods, Inc. Northfield, IL, U.S.A.
Nestle Vevay, Switzerland
New Zealand Dairy Board-Global Dairy Company Wellington, New Zealand
Parmalat Parma, Italy
Unilever London and Rotterdam
·  Strategies of the case firms that U.S. firms might find noteworthy, and possibly worth
emulating, include the following:
—All have expanded in recent years to gain market power to countervail the growing power of
supermarkets, to achieve the size required to obtain economies of scale in R&D and brand
development, and for a host of other reasons.
—All emphasized product differentiation that manifested itself in widely differing ways.  The
New Zealand Dairy Board-Global Dairy Company superimposed product differentiation on
top of being supplied by the world's lowest-cost milk producers.
—Variations of an "Ization" staffing program were practiced by Unilever, Nestle and others.
This involves filling local executive and technical positions in foreign subsidiaries with local
personnel.
—All are in near-constant pursuit of efficiencies.
—Unique strategies were pursued by individual firms, especially the cooperatives.When Will U.S. Firms Become Major Dairy Exporters and Bigger Direct Investors in Foreign Dairy-Food Businesses?
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·  Implications for U.S. firms potentially interested in expanding foreign direct investment include
the following:
—The case firms, for the most part, adjusted well to the distinctive conditions in which they
found themselves.  This is the essence of successful competitive strategy.
—Parmalat's view—one that drove the firm's acquisition strategies in the 1990s—is that the
global fluid milk business is fragmented and ripe for profitable further consolidation.  If
correct, Parmalat's view of the world has implications for the new Dean Foods Company
(Suiza-Dean combination).  This situation could give the new Dean Foods Company
incentives to further consolidate the U.S. fluid milk business and expand in the Mexican and
Canadian markets.
—Surprisingly, strategy may not be the dominant key to the successes enjoyed by the case
firms.  The successful responses of the firms may have occurred substantially because the
firms have assembled and retained superior management for extended periods.
·  The analysis does not disclose when U.S. firms will become bigger foreign direct investors in
dairy-food businesses, but a few relevant points emerged:
—Most of the case firms expanded direct investments in foreign markets because of constraints
in the home country market.
—Foreign direct investment in dairy-food businesses indeed may be somewhat of a "big firm’s
game."
—If much of the U.S. dairy-food market is "flat and fiercely competitive," this will provide
incentives for U.S. firms to consider additional foreign direct investment in dairy-food
businesses.  Whether a U.S. firm should engage in such investment is, of course, a complex
question, the answer to which must be based on a firm's individual circumstances and
capabilities.  But, unlike the situation for dairy exporting—where border protection and price
supports price many U.S. dairy products out of world markets—the barriers to foreign direct
investment appear less daunting.  The prevalence of direct investment by a cross section of
foreign firms in dairy-food businesses suggests something about the prospects for engaging
in such activity successfully.When Will U.S. Firms Become Major Dairy Exporters and Bigger Direct Investors in Foreign Dairy-Food Businesses?
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WHEN WILL U.S. FIRMS BECOME MAJOR DAIRY EXPORTERS AND BIGGER
DIRECT INVESTORS IN FOREIGN DAIRY-FOOD BUSINESSES?
W. D. Dobson, Jeffrey Wagner, and Rodney Hintz
Introduction
Established in 1991, the Babcock Institute for International Dairy Research and Development
carries out studies on international dairy marketing and trade, and on dairy science issues that have
international dimensions.  The Institute's international dairy marketing and trade work—the focus
of this Discussion Paper—has produced case studies and/or industry studies for New Zealand,
Australia, the U.S., Canada, Mexico, Argentina, Ireland, Denmark, Italy, The Netherlands, Russia,
and Kazakhstan.  Several of the case studies represent joint efforts of the Babcock Institute and the
Renk Agribusiness Institute.  The Babcock Institute has also contributed financially to development
of a world dairy trade model.  In early 2001, the Institute issued a report summarizing selected
results of these studies in a paper entitled, "Policy and Management Lessons for Dairy Exporters
and Investors in Foreign Dairy-Food Businesses—What Did We Learn in the Past Decade?"[21].
The earlier paper emphasized general trade and investment lessons for international dairy firms.
This paper has a narrower focus.  It addresses the question posed in the title of the paper and
presents implications for U.S. dairy firms, emphasizing those relating to foreign direct investment.
Like those in the earlier paper, the findings in this publication emerged mainly from studies
conducted by Babcock Institute analysts during 1991-2000.
I. When Will U.S. Firms Become Major Dairy Exporters?
With a few prominent exceptions, the prospects for substantially expanded dairy exports by
U.S. firms are not bright for at least the current decade.  The exceptions for U.S. companies relate
to exports of products such as dried whey, whey fractions, dairy blends, and selected specialty dairy
products (specialty cheeses, premium ice cream, etc.).  Mexico will be an important destination for
U.S. dairy exports.  Over the longer-run, after important barriers to and disincentives for U.S. dairy
exports are eliminated, the U.S. may become more important as a dairy exporting country. This is
so because the U.S. dairy industry already has some internationally competitive producers and
processors who would expand exports of dairy products if disincentives to exporting were
removed.  However, it is impossible to accurately predict when those impediments to U.S. dairy
exporting will fall.  This section explains the rationale for these conclusions.
The Size and Nature of Dairy Exports by U.S. Firms
According to a U.S. Dairy Export Council (USDEC) study, dairy product exports by U.S.
firms were valued at $920 million and $1.0 billion for 1998 and 1999, respectively [64].  Other
statistics describing the relative size of dairy exports by U.S. firms are shown in Table 1.
Table 1. Dairy Product Export Figures for U.S. Firms, 1998 and 1999*
Item 1998 1999
U.S. Dairy Exports
    U.S. $ Value (Bil.)





Milk Equivalent Quantity of
U.S. Dairy Exports as % of
U.S. Milk Production
4.3% 4.9%
$ Value of U.S. Dairy Exports
as % of $ Value of Total U.S.
Agricultural Exports
1.7% 2.0%
* Source:  U.S. Dairy Export Council, 2000 [64] and USDA, Agricultural Outlook [66].When Will U.S. Firms Become Major Dairy Exporters and Bigger Direct Investors in Foreign Dairy-Food Businesses?
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In terms of dollar values, the largest U.S. dairy exports in 1999 were nonfat dry milk (NFDM),
cheese, and whey products.  In milk equivalent terms, the largest exports were NFDM, whey,
lactose, and cheese in 1999.  This largest export group includes certain products in the "prominent
exception" group, for which U.S. dairy exporting prospects are reasonably bright.  Anecdotal
accounts of successful U.S. dairy exporting initiatives frequently include products from this group,
as noted below [22]:
·  Successes of Foremost Farms, Inc. of Baraboo, Wisconsin in exporting dried whey
products to multiple countries.
·  Profits of Davisco in exporting dried whey from Minnesota and Idaho plants.
·  The savvy exhibited by Hilmar Cheese of California in tailoring cheese products for export
to the Japanese market.
·  Cabot Creamery's sales of cheddar cheese to the U.K.
·  Dean Foods' sales of fluid milk to Mexican supermarkets from the firm's southwestern
U.S. plants.
·  Successful exports of specialty cheeses into Mexico by a few upper-midwestern firms.
The successes recorded by U.S. companies in exporting dried whey products—including dairy
blends containing dried whey—are not confined to those described in the anecdotal accounts.  U.S.
firms exported this item to more than 10 countries in 1999, with about 35% of the product going to
Mexico and Canada [23].  Exports of whey fractions are expected to increase when the new Land
O'Lakes-Mitsui joint venture plant becomes fully operational in 2001.  Among other products, this
plant will supply whey fractions for the global market.  Cheese exports—including high-valued
specialty cheeses of the type mentioned above—equaled about one percent of U.S. cheese
production during 1995-99.  Of course, fluid milk is generally costly for U.S. firms to export.
However, Dean Foods has developed a market in Mexico for fluid milk processed in the firm's
Texas and New Mexico plants [17].
Approximately one third of U.S. dairy exports in milk equivalent terms in 1999 consisted of
NFDM—the vast majority of which was exported with USDA Dairy Export Incentive Program
(DEIP) subsidies.  The DEIP has been extensively used to sell the U.S.'s structural surplus of
NFDM in foreign markets.  Approximately 21% of the NFDM produced by the U.S. during 1995-
99 was exported largely with the aid of DEIP export subsidies.  The GATT/WTO limits on U.S.
subsidized exports of NFDM that will apply after 2000/2001 (68.2 thousand metric tons per year)
will limit DEIP exports to the equivalent of about 10% of U.S. NFDM production for 2000.
As noted below, the U.S. had about a 4% share of world dairy exports in 1998 [24].  While the
European Union (EU) had the largest market in 1998, much of that large market share was achieved
with the help of government dairy export subsidies.  Australasia (Australia and New Zealand) held
about a 44% world market share, achieved with little or no use of government export subsidies.








Why Are Dairy Exports by U.S. Firms So Low?
While U.S. companies can point to dairy exporting success stories, in the aggregate U.S. firms
are "bit players" in international dairy markets.  The reason for this is not hard to find.  U.S. pricesWhen Will U.S. Firms Become Major Dairy Exporters and Bigger Direct Investors in Foreign Dairy-Food Businesses?
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for major dairy products have been sharply higher than world prices. As indicated in Table 2, U.S.
central market prices for bulk dairy products during 1990 to 2000 averaged about 50% higher than
world prices as measured by the midpoint of prices reported by the USDA for fob Northern
Europe.  U.S. butter prices—which averaged lower than world prices in 1995—represent the single
exception.
Table 2. Percentages by Which U.S. Central Market Prices for Cheddar Cheese, Butter,
and Nonfat Dry Milk Exceeded World Prices, 1990-2000*
Year Percent by Which U.S. Market Prices Exceeded World Prices
Cheddar Cheese Butter Nonfat Dry Milk
1990 71.4% 58.3% 53.1%
1991 56.8 59.5 51.8
1992 41.6 20.5 39.2
1993 60.3 21.1 60.7
1994 56.0 20.2 55.9
1995 29.4 -18.0 13.6
1996 33.8 42.6 39.4
1997 18.9 48.3 38.1
1998 55.4 111.0 61.2
1999 61.7 89.6 75.8
2000 36.2 97.2 19.3
1990-2000 Avg. 47.4% 50.0% 46.2%
* Source: USDA, "Dairy: World Markets and Trade," Various Issues, 1991-2000 [68].
The importance of price to exporting competitiveness is indicated by a 1995 Cornell University
survey. Fifteen hundred U.S. agricultural exporters were asked by Cornell researchers to rank the
importance of 13 obstacles to exporting [10, p.38].  Respondents named "meeting prices of foreign
competitors" as the most important obstacle by a sizable margin.  Thus, when U.S. dairy product
prices exceed world prices by the amounts indicated in Table 2, it is no surprise that U.S. bulk dairy
products are generally priced out of world markets.
U.S. prices of cheddar cheese, butter, and NFDM are higher than world prices substantially
because of differences between U.S. domestic and foreign supply-demand conditions for milk and
dairy products, U.S. border protection (tariffs, tariff rate quotas, and minimum access provisions)
for these products, and to a lesser extent because of operation of the USDA's dairy price support
program.  In recent years, the strong U.S. dollar has exacerbated the problem created by the price
disparity.
Over-quota tariffs on imports of U.S. dairy products in 2000 were as follows [14]:




WMP 1,122/mt 0.51/lb.When Will U.S. Firms Become Major Dairy Exporters and Bigger Direct Investors in Foreign Dairy-Food Businesses?
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U.S. border protection is important.  This is suggested by the fact that U.S. prices for butter,
cheese, and NFDM stayed substantially above world prices for extended periods during the 1990s,
when there was little price support activity involving these dairy products.  For example, in fiscal
1996, U.S. prices of cheddar cheese, butter and NFDM averaged more than a third above world
prices, while the USDA's net outlays for dairy price support purposes were negative.  This
indicates, in part, that on balance for the year the government was a net seller of dairy products onto
the commercial market [65].  (Government receipts from the Dairy Assessment Program also
contributed to the negative net outlay number for fiscal 1996.)
It also is not surprising that U.S. exports of dried whey products are increasing.  There is no
USDA price support program and attendant restrictive border protection program for dried whey to
price the product out of international markets.  Not so obvious are the reasons for expanding
exports of specialty cheeses and premium ice cream.  In part, exports of these items have expanded
because they are differentiated products that can be sold competitively in international markets
despite raw product cost disadvantages in the U.S. and high tariffs in foreign markets.
When Will U.S. Firms Obtain Incentives to Expand Dairy Exports Substantially?
Not soon, if Cox's World Dairy Model provides useful predictions.  The Cox Model is a
mathematical programming model that uses FAO production and trade figures for 1989-94 as base
period data [14].  Tariff and non-tariff barriers and constraints agreed to under the Uruguay Round
GATT negotiations are included in the model.  While the model fails to take account of certain
market imperfections, especially the influence of large traders and investors, it reflects many of the
underlying economic forces operating in world dairy markets.
Cox evaluated a number of scenarios with the model.  The one most relevant for  purposes of
this paper is the GATT/WTO 2005 scenario that extrapolates from 2000 to 2005 certain provisions
of the agreements on dairy (minimum access, tariff changes, and reductions in export subsidies)
reached under the GATT/WTO Uruguay Round. In essence, this scenario portrays a continuation
of measures to open world dairy markets during 2000-2005 at the same rate that these markets were
opened during 1995-2000. While major market distortions remain after GATT/WTO 2005, the
model indicates that the world would move about half way to "Free Trade" by 2005 under this
scenario.
Cox's GATT/WTO 2005 scenario predicts price reductions for milk producers in Western
Europe, modest price changes for producers in Japan and Canada, little change in milk prices for
the U.S., and economic gains for low-cost exporters.  Farm milk prices fall 13% to 14% in Western
Europe, increase by 8% to 9% in Oceania, and change relatively little in the U.S. under this
scenario.  However, the quantity of U.S. exports of dairy products would increase under this
scenario.  Interestingly, a "Free Trade" scenario produced similar results.  Losses for producers in
Western Europe were bigger under the Free Trade scenario and so were gains for producers in
Oceania, but U.S. producers saw their farm milk prices remain essentially unchanged under Free
Trade.
The prospect of little or no price gain for U.S. dairy farmers from freer trade in dairy products
partially explains the lack of strong interest on the part of most U.S. dairy cooperatives in dairy
trade liberalization.  The conclusions and implications flowing from the World Dairy Model are
plausible because the results correspond broadly to industry expectations arrived at through a
number of analytical avenues.  Even the results for the Free Trade scenario confirm what a few
major dairy exporters have understood in a general way for decades.
Given the price reduction in store for EU milk producers under scenarios similar to
GATT/WTO 2005, it is even less surprising that many EU dairy farmers show little eagerness for
additional dairy trade liberalization.  EU milk producers would, of course, face a host of problems
under liberalized dairy trade.  In particular, the EU milk production quotas—now scheduled to
remain in effect until 2008—could be jeopardized by substantially expanded imports of dairy
products.  In addition, before agreeing to dairy trade liberalization and other major agriculturalWhen Will U.S. Firms Become Major Dairy Exporters and Bigger Direct Investors in Foreign Dairy-Food Businesses?
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policy changes, the EU would undoubtedly prefer to decide (under the Common Agricultural
Policies) how to accommodate Eastern European countries that eventually will join the Union.  In
view of the continued resistance to substantially freer trade in dairy products from both U.S. and
EU producers, it is difficult to envision major liberalization of dairy markets in the next few years.
The U.S., of course, is not likely to unilaterally deregulate and open its dairy markets in the absence
of similar, substantive moves by the EU and others.
What Would It Mean if the U.S. Unilaterally Deregulated?
While unilateral deregulation of U.S. milk markets is unlikely, it is useful to note what such an
action would entail.  Unilateral deregulation would mean eliminating the U.S. dairy industry's
border protection, ending the dairy price support program, and allowing domestic dairy product
prices to fall to new equilibrium levels closer to world prices.  In the absence of deregulation by
other dairy countries, this development would produce lower average U.S. milk and dairy product
prices, and probably greater price variability.  The latter development would be encouraged by the
thinness of world dairy markets—world dairy trade accounts for the equivalent of only 6% to 7%
of world milk production.  If the U.S. placed substantial additional quantities of dairy products onto
this market, it would not only drive down world prices but could also—depending upon the timing
of U.S. sales and actions of competitors—increase the variability of world dairy product prices.
What Could Make Unilateral Deregulation Palatable?
Is there any policy action that would make unilateral deregulation palatable to U.S. dairy
farmers?  Compensation for producers might.  Moreover, it is an option worth thinking about since
the U.S. dairy industry has a producer cost structure that could make the industry competitive in
international dairy markets with fewer structural adjustments than would be necessary in countries
with high farm milk production costs (such as parts of the EU).  After making the structural
adjustments, the U.S. could be a significant player in international dairy markets.  Furthermore,
there is a model—Australia has developed a deregulation-compensation package that promises to
make that country's dairy industry more competitive in international dairy markets.  Australia's dairy
farmers began to receive compensation for accepting virtually complete deregulation beginning in
mid-2000.  Under this complex compensation package, an average fluid milk producer in
Queensland will receive the equivalent of about U.S.$63,000 over an eight-year period in return for
accepting deregulation [24].  It is unclear what level of compensation would be required to persuade
U.S.  milk  producers to accept deregulation. But, if the U.S. dairy industry is serious about
becoming internationally competitive in dairy exporting, it would pay to find out.
Implications for U.S. Dairy Exporters of Maintaining the Status Quo
Thomas Suber, Executive Director of the USDEC, characterized the future of the U.S. dairy
industry as one where real costs of milk production are declining, domestic demand is growing
modestly, and the role of government is declining.  As a result, he claimed that "…the processors,
cooperatives, traders, and farmers who determine USDEC policy face the future with a cold realism
that either we compete internationally or we will shrink as an industry [58]."  Suber advanced this
hypothesis in 1999 when termination of the USDA's dairy price support program was imminent.
But, the December 31, 1999 termination date for the USDA's dairy price support program was
scrubbed, and it now appears that the program has new life extending at least through 2002.
Whether the U.S. dairy industry will actually shrink is unclear.  The industry grew during the
1990s by an average of 1.3% per year (as measured by milk production) despite limited dairy
exports [65]. But it is no stretch to conclude that growth of the U.S. dairy industry over the longer-
run will be less than it would be if dairy exports were increasing in a robust fashion.
The growth in U.S. milk production during the 1990s contrasts sharply with that of New
Zealand, which began gearing up in the early 1990s to expand dairy exports.  New Zealand's milk
production increased by an average of 5.3% per year during the 1990s, and in three years during
the decade recorded double-digit increases averaging 12.6% per year [68].When Will U.S. Firms Become Major Dairy Exporters and Bigger Direct Investors in Foreign Dairy-Food Businesses?
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In addition to limiting growth of the industry, the status quo will create interregional competitive
pressures.  Three firms plan to increase California's cheese processing capacity by up to 40% by
the mid-2000s [23].  If these firms have no incentive to export, they will turn inward and compete
aggressively with domestic firms in the Upper Midwest for cheese sales.  Hence, the status quo will
not be without pain for part of the industry.
If U.S. dairy firms ultimately find themselves positioned to become major exporters, they may
not be well served by a de facto better-late-than-never strategy.  The early movers in dairy exporting
—chiefly Australasian and Argentine firms—will have sewed up many attractive accounts in the
growth markets of Asia and Latin America before the U.S. gets around to expanding dairy exports
in a significant way.
The Bottom Line for U.S. Dairy Exports
Exports of U.S. dried whey products, dairy blends, and selected specialty dairy items will
undoubtedly increase in the next few years.  NFDM exports generally will equal the amount that
can be exported with DEIP subsidies, but occasionally will exceed that figure when world prices
rise above U.S. prices for the product.  Mexico is likely to be an important growth market for U.S.
dairy exports—in part because of low Mexican dairy import tariffs negotiated under the NAFTA
and expanding demand in the country.  With such exceptions, however, raw product cost
disadvantages will sharply limit exports of bulk and partially differentiated dairy products by U.S.
firms for much of the current decade.  It would take deregulation of the U.S. dairy industry to
change the latter situation. The comments of Michael Porter of Harvard's Business School describe
why deregulation is often an unattractive option to those in a protected industry  [49, p.87]:
Deregulating a protected industry...will lead to bankruptcies sooner and to stronger, more
competitive companies only later.
Thus, the uncertain benefits from deregulation for the U.S. dairy industry would occur in the
future after substantial adjustment pain.  This is not a prospect that is likely to make politically
influential U.S. milk producer organizations clamor for deregulation and a bigger role for U.S.
firms in the international dairy trade in the near future.  Consumers and certain milk processors
might relish deregulation, but they are unlikely to wield the political power to do much to produce
such a result.  Therefore, in summary, there are plenty of reasons why U.S. firms collectively will
remain bit players in dairy exporting for at least the current decade.
II. When Will U.S. Firms Become Bigger Investors in Foreign Dairy-Food Businesses?
U.S. firms also appear to have limited involvement in foreign direct investment in dairy-food
businesses.  Of course, Kraft Foods is a prominent exception.  Kraft Foods, a unit of the Philip
Morris Companies, which was partially spun out of the parent company through an initial public
offering in 2001, is in the same league as Nestle and Unilever regarding foreign direct investment in
dairy-food businesses.  Schreiber Foods also has noteworthy foreign direct investments in dairy
food businesses in Mexico, Brazil, Germany, and India.  However, with such exceptions there are
few big U.S. players involved in foreign direct investment in dairy-food businesses.
What would explain this phenomenon?  Many reasonable hypotheses can be advanced.  The
U.S. market is large, familiar, mostly English speaking, and largely devoid of corruption, making it
an attractive market for U.S. firms to serve.  In the U.S., the risks of nonpayment by customers and
defaults on contracts are less than in many foreign markets.  In addition, capital constraints may
limit the dairy-related foreign direct investments of some smaller U.S. firms.  More generally, many
small and mid-sized dairy firms may conclude that foreign direct investment in dairy-food
businesses is a "big firm's game."
It is plausible for U.S. companies to conclude that there are satisfactory profits to be made by
expanding sales of dairy products in the U.S. rather than in foreign markets.  Thus, when U.S.
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are no profits to be made in the U.S., why have so many foreign companies expanded direct
investments in the U.S. dairy industry?  To support this reasoning they point out that Danone
(France), Lactalis (France), Diegeo (UK), Glanbia (Ireland), Kerry Group (Ireland), Nestle
(Switzerland), Unilever (UK-Netherlands), and Parmalat (Italy) increased or maintained substantial
dairy-food investments in the U.S. in the 1990s and 2000.  This pattern of foreign direct investment
by the European firms undoubtedly reflects a host of considerations.  One important consideration
is the desire on the part of the European firms to expand sales of their well-known branded
products.  Brand expansion by the firms is feasible in the U.S. partly because of the greater
availability of milk supplies in this country.
U.S. firms may have concluded that there is ample room for achieving economies and
increasing profits by further consolidating the U.S. dairy industry.  For example, this might be the
situation in the fluid milk business.  There has been a spate of highly publicized consolidations of
the U.S. fluid milk business in the 1990s and 2000, most notably the acquisitions made by Suiza
Foods and Dean Foods.  After acquiring many smaller firms, these two largest fluid milk
processors in the U.S. announced in 2001 that they themselves would merge.  However, together
these firms hold only about a 35% market share in the U.S. fluid milk market.  While these two
companies already have absorbed some of the most profitable smaller, regional firms, the U.S. fluid
milk industry may be ripe for further consolidation.
Heavy emphasis on domestic sales may limit profits of U.S. dairy-food firms, however.  One
reason was mentioned by a former CEO of Nestle who characterized U.S. and European dairy-food
markets as being "flat and fiercely competitive [59]."  This belief has encouraged Nestle to expand
dairy-food sales in the growth markets of Latin America and Asia rather than spend excessive
amounts of energy fighting over market share in the U.S. and Western Europe.  Of course, this
view does not mean that Nestle makes no direct investments in U.S. dairy-food businesses.  It is
simply a statement about priorities.
Finally, disappointing prospects for further liberalization of world dairy markets make foreign
direct investment in growth markets a potentially attractive alternative to exporting.  John Roadley,
then Chairman-Designate of the Global Dairy Company, argued in early 2001 that if New Zealand's
dairy industry is to grow competitively, it must increase foreign direct investment in dairy
businesses and use domestically-produced milk in the country of the acquired business rather than
rely nearly exclusively on exports of New Zealand dairy products.  Roadley elaborated on his
position as follows [55, p.2]:
While we have been successful in achieving a third of international dairy trade (mainly
through operations of the NZDB), the lion's share of the global dairy business is not traded
across borders.  The part of the market that is accessible to us is as small as six percent of
world dairy production.  Ninety-four percent of the market is largely inaccessible to us
because of trade restrictions…(We will need to continue ) to work closely with government on
international trade liberalization.  But far more immediately, we need to seek acquisitions and
joint ventures with companies already operating in the inaccessible part of the market.  And
we need to continue to invest in leading-edge research and development, manufacturing
technologies and brand development.
For reasons noted by the NZDB-Global Dairy Company and others, many companies located
outside the U.S. are engaging in foreign direct investment in dairy-food businesses.  Do these firms
know something that U.S. companies are overlooking?
Background Information and Competitive Strategies of the Case Firms
The remainder of the paper analyzes key strategies of a cross section of firms that are
successfully involved in direct investment in foreign dairy-food businesses to identify strategies that
may be worth emulating by U.S. dairy-food firms.  As will be evident, most of the case firms are
involved in both dairy exporting and foreign direct investment in dairy-food businesses. The firms
whose strategies were scrutinized are:When Will U.S. Firms Become Major Dairy Exporters and Bigger Direct Investors in Foreign Dairy-Food Businesses?
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Firm Location of Headquarters
Arla Foods Aarhus, Denmark
Kerry Group/PLC Tralee, Ireland
Kraft Foods, Inc. Northfield, Illinois, U.S.A.
Nestle Vevay, Switzerland
New Zealand Dairy Board-Global Dairy Company Wellington, New Zealand
Parmalat Parma, Italy
Unilever London, UK and
Rotterdam, The Netherlands
With the exception of the NZDB-Global Dairy Company, the firms analyzed appear in the list
of the world's top 20 dairy companies (Table 3).  Because the NZDB-Global Dairy Company was
not yet established when the list was developed, that firm does not appear in the table. However, that
firm's strategies are analyzed because the NZDB-Global Dairy Company (like the NZDB before it)
will be a major player in dairy exporting and foreign direct investment in dairy-food businesses.
Table 3. The World's Top 20 Dairy Food Companies, 1999*
Company Home Country Dairy Sales Total Sales
(Billion U.S. $)
1.   Nestle Switzerland $11.85 $45.58
2.   Philip Morris (Kraft) U.S. 8.70** 27.50
3.   Danone France 5.91 12.56
4.   Parmalat Italy 5.20 6.16
5.   Unilever UK/Netherlands 5.00 40.49
6.   Lactalis(Besnier) France 4.54 4.54
7.   Arla-MD Foods Sweden-Denmark 4.30 4.50
8.   Snow Brands Japan 4.20** NA
9.   Suiza Foods U.S. 3.99 4.48
10. Friesland-Coberco Netherlands 3.62 3.80
11. Meiji Milk Products Japan 3.50** NA
12. Campina-Melkunie Netherlands 3.30 3.30
13. Morinaga Milk Industry Japan 3.30** NA
14. Bongrain France 3.27 3.27
15. Dean Foods U.S. 2.99 3.76
16. Land O'Lakes U.S. 2.74 5.61
17. Sodiaal Industry France 2.56 2.56
18. Kerry Group Ireland 2.32 2.40
19. Nordmilch Germany 2.27 2.27
20. Dairy Farmers of Am. U.S. 1.98 7.30**
* Sources: Fusaro, D., "Consolidation's Dairy Peak,"       Dairy Foods     , July 2000 [29], Rabobank International, 1999
[59], and selected annual reports for 1999.  Figures for cooperatives do not include sales of raw producer milk.
**Figures for 1998.
Prior to discussing potentially valuable strategies for U.S. firms, it is useful to provide a brief
amount of background for the case firms and list key strategies of those firms.  It also is useful to
define what we mean by competitive strategy (strategy for short). We found it useful to adopt
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company to its environment [50, p.3]."  A caveat is in order regarding the analysis.  The material
represents a "snapshot" of background information and strategies for case firms for a particular
point in time—generally 1998-2000. Thus, the information presented will not reflect all recent
acquisitions of dairy-food businesses by case firms. Moreover, in some instances the sales
information will differ from that specified in Table 3 because useful, available information was for a
period different from that shown in the table.
Readers wishing to see only a summary analysis of strategies of the case firms should skip to
the section entitled "Summary of Foreign Direct Investment  Strategies of Case Firms."
Arla Foods
·  BACKGROUND.  Formally established on April 17, 2000, Aarhus, Denmark-based Arla
Foods is the product of the merger of MD Foods of Denmark and Sweden's Arla Cooperative.
It is one of the first mergers of major cooperatives from two different countries.  The proposed
merger required the clearance by the competition authorities of the seven countries where MD
Foods and Arla Cooperative held substantial market shares. Arla Foods is owned by the
approximately 17,000 Danish and Swedish milk producers who supply milk to the
organization [3].
Milk processed by Arla Foods originates from the following sources [4]:
Source Amount % of Total
Denmark 4.1 billion kg 58.6%
Sweden 2.1 billion kg 30.0
UK 0.8 billion kg 11.4
Total 7.0 billion kg 100.0%
Sales revenues of Arla Foods will total about DKK 36 billion per year (approximately U.S.$4.2
billion based on exchange rates for late May 2001), making the firm one of Europe's largest
dairy organizations.  Arla Foods' sales were distributed across countries or regions and
products as follows in 2000 [3, p.50]:
Country or Region % of Total Sales Products % of Total Sales
Sweden 29.0% Fresh Products 40.5%
Denmark 24.0 Cheese 26.6
Other EU 30.4 Butter & Spreads 11.6
Rest of Europe 1.9 Condensed Milk 14.8
Middle East 5.1 Packaging & Additives 2.9
North America 2.4 Other 3.6





Prospective efficiency gains were part of the rationale for the merger.  However, earlier plant
closings and other efficiency-generating measures within MD Foods and Arla Cooperative had
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after the merger.  Earlier plant closings as a result of merger of MD Foods and Kloever Maelk
in Denmark provide prominent examples.
Two initiatives undertaken prior to the time that the MD Foods-Arla Cooperative merger was
completed are noteworthy.  One was a joint venture between Arla Foods Ingredients and the
Argentine dairy cooperative, SanCor. This initiative created the first large-scale whey processing
plant in Argentina.  The plant will be supplied with whey from SanCor's 14 cheese operations
[3].  This joint venture plant will provide additional competition for food ingredient sales for
firms such as the Kerry Group of Ireland and U.S. whey processors.  A second initiative was
the construction of the Taulov, Denmark yellow cheese factory, which is one of the most highly
automated, energy efficient, and flexible cheese plants in the world [40].  The Taulov plant will
produce 55 million pounds of cheese per year.  Two existing dairy processing plants were
closed when the Taulov plant became operational.
·  STRATEGIES OF MD FOODS.  Key strategies pursued by MD Foods in the pre-merger
period—which are likely to be retained in the merged organization—included those noted
below.
1. The European market will receive first priority, but the firm's investments in a few countries
in the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Latin America reveal MD Foods' global view [38].
2. MD Foods attaches importance to building strategic alliances with foreign dairies [38].
Arla Cooperative and other organizations possessing limited exporting capabilities can make
use of the firm's exporting network and experience.
3. The firm has developed a Key Account Management System to promote close cooperation
with a few multiples (supermarkets) as to product range, terms of delivery, logistics, and
product development [18].  This applies in particular to Germany, the UK, France, Holland,
and Sweden but will spread to other countries as well.
4. The organization will move away from bulk products and go for growth by added value
[18].  Consequently, a larger share of the firm's production will be sold to customers in the
industrialized world.
5. R&D will receive additional emphasis and bigger marketing projects will result from the
added emphasis placed on this functional area.
·  STRATEGIES OF ARLA FOODS, CIRCA 2000-2001.
1. In the ingredients area, Arla Foods will establish itself as one of the world's leading global
suppliers of added value, milk-based ingredients for selected areas within the food
industry [5].
2. Arla will be the market leader in Northern Europe for all types of dairy products with strong
brands and strong consumer confidence [5].
3. Arla Foods will grow through organic development, acquisitions, and the development of
profitable products [5].
4. The firm will focus on European markets and certain selected markets outside Europe [36].
5. The newly formed organization called the Arla Foods Innovation and Environment unit will
be employed to combine the R&D and environmental functions of Arla Cooperative and
MD Foods [3, p.35].
Kerry Group, PLC
·  BACKGROUND.  Headquartered in Tralee, County Kerry Ireland, the Kerry Group/PLC is a
diversified food ingredients and consumer foods company [71].  The firm grew from a small
dairy cooperative that had sales of about U.S.$50 million in 1974 to a multinational with sales
of U.S.$2.4 billion in 1999.
Much of this growth was achieved by acquisitions of food ingredients firms.  Kerry
Group/PLC opened its first overseas food ingredients manufacturing plant in Jackson,
Wisconsin in 1987, and in 1988 acquired Beatreme Food Ingredients (a division of Beatrice
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$402 million in 1994.  By 1995, Kerry Group/PLC had made 43 acquisitions, acquisitions that
doubled the firm's size in each of the previous five-year periods. By 1999,  Kerry had
operations in Ireland, the U.S., continental Europe, Canada, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, Chile,
New Zealand, Australia, and Malaysia.
The firm's acquisitions have produced a strong emphasis on food ingredients as indicated by
Kerry's Divisional sales figures for 1998 [71]:
·  Kerry Ingredients 63%
·  Kerry Foods 34%
·  Kerry Agribusiness 3%
As the firm grew into a world leadership position in food ingredients, the sales of Irish-based
dairy products declined to about 11% of the firm's total revenues.
·  STRATEGIES.  In the early 1970s, a brucellosis eradication program reduced the milk supply
of Kerry Cooperative (parent of the current organization) by about 20%.  Facing this situation,
the Kerry Cooperative's management and board of directors concluded that, if the firm was to
grow, it needed to reduce its reliance on commodity dairy products and diversify into
differentiated products.  Accordingly, the firm pursued the following strategies [71]:
1. Emphasized production and sale of food ingredients.
2. Acquired firms selling branded food products.
3. Beginning in 1986, exchanged the assets of Kerry Cooperative for a majority holding in a
public limited company, mainly to obtain capital for growth.
4. Emphasized quality and continuity in management.
5. Increased expenditures on R&D to 2%-3% of sales in order to remain competitive in the
food ingredients business.
6. Emphasized growth through acquisitions, especially of profitable food ingredients firms.
7. Sought 15% per year earnings growth—10% from organic growth and 5% to 6% from
acquisitions [72].
Kraft Foods, Inc.
·  BACKGROUND.  Kraft Foods traces its origins to the early 1900s when J.L. Kraft and Bros.
Co. became a successful Chicago cheese distributor.  Founder J.L. Kraft's vision for the
company was to bring to retailers a variety of cheeses of consistent quality and with longer shelf
life.  One early contribution of the company was to develop processed cheese in 1916 [16].
The Philip Morris Companies, one of which is Kraft Foods, had aggregate sales of $78.6
billion in 1999.  Philip Morris' acquisition of Kraft Foods was sandwiched between the firm's
acquisitions of two other major food companies, as indicated below:
Company Acquired by Philip Morris Year of Acquisition
General Foods Corporation 1985
Kraft Foods 1988
Nabisco Holdings 2000
The major companies acquired by Philip Morris had themselves acquired many smaller
companies during their years as independent organizations.  For example, the Oscar Mayer
Company was previously part of General Foods and eventually became a prominent part of
Kraft Foods.
Globally, Philip Morris Companies operate food businesses in over 100 countries and generate
in excess of $27 billion each year [48].  Food sales revenues of the Philip Morris Companies in
1999 were distributed among Kraft Foods International (KFI), Kraft Foods North America
(KFNA), Philip Morris Latin America (PMLA) and subdivisions of the first two units as shownWhen Will U.S. Firms Become Major Dairy Exporters and Bigger Direct Investors in Foreign Dairy-Food Businesses?
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in Figure 1.  Industry analysts estimate that KFNA contributions about 64% of Philip Morris'
food revenues, while KFI provides 32% and PMLA 4%, respectively [15,48,53].
Figure 1. Total Food Sales and Food Sales by Subsidiaries, Philip Morris
Companies, Inc., 1999
















* Source: [15,48 and 53].
KFI has a substantial presence in Europe.  Sales from that unit in 1998 totaled $2.2 billion in
Germany, $1.1 billion in France, $920 million in Italy, and $3.5 billion in other European
countries [15].
Food Sales revenues of the Philip Morris Companies in 1998 were distributed among the
different food categories as shown the following schedule:









* Source: Philip Morris Companies, Inc. Fact Book 2000 [47].
Philip Morris owns a host of well-known dairy brands including Kraft, Philadelphia, Velveeta,
Cheez Whiz, Breakstone's, Knudsen, Cracker Barrel, Polly-O Churney, and Athenos.
A particularly successful KFI product is Philadelphia Cream Cheese.  Sold in over 30 countries,
this product has maintained a 4% sales growth rate since 1995.  Philadelphia Cream Cheese is a
leader among KFI's 21 brands each of which generate revenues exceeding $100 million per
year.  The product has leading market shares in Germany, Italy, the UK, Belgium, Spain,
Austria and Australia [47].
Kraft's U.S. market shares in 1999 were as follows for the cheese brand categories noted in the
following schedule [23]:
Brand Category Kraft’s Dollar Share
Natural Cheese Brands 21%
Natural Shredded Cheese Brands 31
American Cheese Brands 61
These figures give only general indications of the nature of Kraft Foods and Philip Morris'
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businesses, as they existed before the acquisition of Nabisco Holdings.  They also fail to reflect
ongoing reorganizations of the company and consolidation of acquired food businesses.  More
enduring information is provided by insights into Kraft-Philip Morris strategies.
·  STRATEGIES.  The global strategies of Philip Morris' food businesses include efforts to
foster product diversity, country-specific marketing, international cross fertilization, and
aggressive new product development.  Specific strategies pursued by the firm that are consistent
with this "umbrella" strategy include the following:
1. The company strives to maintain diversity at both the category and brand level, and has used
its R&D capabilities to create new categories.
2. Packaging and advertising are tailored specifically for each country.  This is contrary to the
current strategy employed by certain other multinational consumer packaged goods
companies, which are moving to a single, international packaging design.
3. The company encourages a free exchange of ideas and products across international
boundaries.
4. New product development is a key element of the firm's marketing strategy, since it enables
the firm to maintain a diversified portfolio of brands and permits development of products
for specific ethnic or cultural groups that can be employed in other regions.
5. Kraft Foods North America purchases the majority of its cheese for further processing,
rather than processing cheese from raw milk.  Thus the firm focuses on the value-added
cheese segment.
6. The firm divests itself of product lines that face stiff competition from well-established local
brands and offer limited opportunity for rapid growth.  This strategy has manifested itself in
the firm's divestiture of several dairy operations in Germany and Australia during the 1990s.
7. Philip Morris' food companies have developed and promoted value-added products that
provide higher-than-average profit margins, while avoiding commodity products such as
fluid milk.
8. The firm aims for high market share for many categories and brands.  
For the most part, these specific strategies are orthodox, suggesting that the firm's high profit
margins result substantially from excellent management.
Nestle
·  BACKGROUND.  The company traces its origins to the Anglo-Swiss Condensed Milk
Company founded in 1866 in Cham, Switzerland.  The Anglo-Swiss company merged with
Farine Lactee Henri Nestle—a producer of infant formula—in 1905 to create the foundation for
the modern company.  Over the years, the company has developed or acquired such well-known
brands as Carnation, Klim, Nescafe, Libby's, Friskies, Stouffers, Kitkat and Perrier [17,41].
However, these brands understate Nestle's brand presence worldwide.  The company has about
8,000 brands, nearly a tenth of which are registered in more than one country.
In 1999, the company had about 230,000 employees, 495 factories in 77 countries, and sales of
about U.S.$46.7 billion [17,51,74].  The company operates 17 R&D facilities with a combined
budget of $600 million per year [74, p.114].  In 1998, Nestle was the world's largest seller of
powdered/condensed milk, non-dairy creamers, soluble coffee, mineral water, and chocolate and
confectionery products [51, p.73].  Nestle is the world's No. 2 seller of ice cream, behind
Unilever.
·  STRATEGIES.  Nestle's strategies, which are associated mainly with foreign direct investments
in dairy and other food businesses, include the following:
1. Balance sales between low risk and low-growth countries of the developed world and high-
risk and potentially high-growth markets of Asia, Latin America, and Africa [60].
2. Keep brands local and people regional; only technology goes global [52].
3. In developed markets, grow and gain economies of scale through foreign direct investment
in big companies such as Carnation, Perrier, and Stouffer.  In the developing world, grow byWhen Will U.S. Firms Become Major Dairy Exporters and Bigger Direct Investors in Foreign Dairy-Food Businesses?
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manipulating ingredients or processing technology for local conditions, and employ
appropriate (often local) brands [52].
4. In developing countries, first establish sales channels by making basic, mass-produced
foodstuffs that the locals can afford.  Then as consumers in these countries grow richer,
pump higher-valued products through these same channels [25].
5. Deepen the pool of Asian and other developing country managers to gain a cadre of
autonomous regional managers who know more about the culture of the local markets than
Americans or Europeans [52].
6. Employ a wide-area strategy for Asia that involves producing different products in each
country to supply the region with a given product from one country [45].
7. Selectively  strike strategic partnerships in instances when this will clearly produce
advantages for the firm.
8. Engage in continuous improvement and nearly constant cost cutting.  Discover the root
sources of competitive advantage for the firm [74, p.119].
9. Initiate or join business-to-business internet-based systems that offer the firm and
competitors an opportunity to drive down costs by pooling their purchases from commonly
used suppliers, and by automating certain accounting functions [28].
10. Seek to achieve 4% per year real internal growth [74, p.117].
New Zealand Dairy Board-Global Dairy Company
·  BACKGROUND.  Established in 1924, the New Zealand Dairy Board (NZDB) is
headquartered in Wellington, New Zealand [17].  From June 30, 1998 to May 31, 1999, the
NZDB had sales of NZ$7.4 billion (approximately US$3.3 billion).  The firm employed 9,800
staff in New Zealand and in 98 subsidiary and 19 associate companies worldwide [44].  The
firm had about a 31% market share in world dairy export markets (in milk equivalent terms) in
1999 [21], and presently has a single desk (monopoly) exporting privilege granted by New
Zealand's parliament.
The NZDB is in transition.  The Board is scheduled to become part of a combined organization
called the Global Dairy Company that includes the current New Zealand Dairy Group and Kiwi
Cooperative—two cooperatives that process more than 95% of the milk marketed in New
Zealand.  The Board also is scheduled to lose its statutory monopoly exporting privilege one
year after it becomes part of the larger organization.
·  EARLY CORE AND SUBSIDIARY STRATEGIES OF THE NZDB.
1. Lift the 30% to 40% of milk, which is sold as value-added (differentiated or partially
differentiated) products, to close to 100% as soon as possible [57].
2. Subsidiary strategies include the following [43]: (a) expand the Board's global own-brand
consumer products business, (b) grow the value-added food ingredients business, (c)
develop  further the Board's international food service business, (d) increase dominance of
the UK consumer butter and cheese markets, and (e) continue to take advantage of
opportunities created in Europe by the GATT/WTO agreement.
3. Superimpose the core and subsidiary product differentiation strategies onto a strategy of
being supplied by the world's lowest-cost milk producers.
·  STRATEGIES OF THE NZDB, CIRCA 1999-2000 [21].
1. Create a global dairy business four times larger than the New Zealand dairy industry of
2000 within 10 years.
2. Create value for New Zealand's dairy farmers by manufacturing and marketing products in
the following categories: (a) Value-added dairy products and dairy commodities made from
New Zealand milk, and (b) dairy products made with milk from other countries using the
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3. Use local milk where shelf life restrictions rule out use of New Zealand product and be
prepared to do business in countries where tariff barriers price New Zealand products out of
the market.
4. Establish targets of a 15% minimum return on the total gross assets of the New Zealand
dairy businesses, 15% annual growth in revenues, and a 4% annual improvement in
productivity from farm to consumer.
·  STRATEGIES OF THE NZDB–GLOBAL DAIRY COMPANY (Combined organization
consisting of the New Zealand Dairy Group, Kiwi Cooperative and the NZDB) [55].
1. Integrate the manufacturing and marketing arms of New Zealand's major firms to allow the
industry to compete more effectively in world dairy markets.
2. Seek coordinated acquisitions of, and joint ventures with, companies already operating in
inaccessible parts of the world dairy market—94% of the market.
3. Obtain scale economies in R&D and brand development.
Parmalat
·  BACKGROUND.  Headquartered in Parma, Italy, Parmalat Finanziaria SPA (Parmalat) grew
from a small cold cuts and preserves firm in 1961 into the fourth largest dairy firm in the world
in 1999.  In 2000, the founding Tanzi family still held 51% of the 1.529 million shares
outstanding through the family's holding company,  Coloniale S.r.l.  Parmalat's dairy sales in
1999 totaled U.S.$5.2 billion, placing the firm bellow only Nestle, Kraft, and Danone (Table 3).
Parmalat had 41,670 employees in 33 subsidiaries in Europe and 61 subsidiaries in other parts
of the world in 1999 [31,54].  Products produced and marketed by Parmalat include milk (UHT
and pasteurized), cream, bechamel sauce, yogurt, desserts, fruit juices, tomato-based sauces, tea-
based drinks, vegetable soups, snacks, biscuits and cakes.  The company's products are sold
under the following brands: Parmalat, Santal, Pomi, Pais, KYR, and Mister Day.
In 1999, the company's sales were distributed across major product categories and regions as
follows [56]:
Product Category % of Sales Geographic Region % of Sales
Milk and By-Products 61% Europe 31%
Fresh Products 24 North America 31
Vegetable Products 8 South America 28
Baked Products and Other 7 Rest of the World 10
Total 100% Total 100%
The company's North American sales in 1999 included operations in New York, Georgia, and
Florida, with U.S. sales totaling $650 million.  Parmalat ranked 27
th in the U.S. in terms of
dairy sales for 1999, just ahead of Nestle (dairy only).  Operating in part under a joint venture
with Dairyworld Foods, the firm is a leading fluid milk supplier in Canada [56].
Parmalat is a world leader in UHT milk production and sales.  UHT milk is Parmalat's
strongest branded product and accounts for about 90% of the firm's milk sales (55% of the
firm's total sales) [37].  This product, which has a shelf life of about six months in the
unopened container, represents the bulk of the firm's sales in South America and half of the
firm's sales in Europe.  Parmalat's sales of UHT milk in developing countries were fostered by
the following developments:
1. Governments in developing countries promoted consumption of UHT milk as a safe
alternative to poor quality tap water.
2. Government programs to combat malnutrition included UHT milk.
3. The longer shelf life and no refrigeration costs led retailers to prefer to carry shelf-stable
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Reflecting an aggressive acquisition strategy,  Parmalat expanded its presence from six
countries to 31 countries during the 1990s.  The company's total sales grew by 800% from
1990 to 1999—two-thirds of which was accounted for by acquisitions.  The firm's sheer
number of acquisitions in the late 1990s—29 companies in 1998 and 1999—may have led to
operating inefficiencies.  A number of analysts have questioned the wisdom of Parmalat's
decision to enter the mature, highly competitive markets of the U.S., Canada and Australia.
Profit margins for the firm's North American acquisitions were lower than the company
average—probably reflecting a nonoptimal product mix in the North American operations and
lower productivity.
Parmalat's acquisitions are expected to decline in number during the early 2000s as the firm
focuses on integrating new businesses into the overall company and cutting costs.  The cost-
cutting measures will include plant closures, paring down of operating costs, and streamlining
distribution.  The firm anticipates that these measures and the launch of value-added products
will increase the firm's operating margins, which are below those of leading dairy firms in the
EU and the U.S.
·  STRATEGIES.  Parmalat's key strategies included the following during the 1980s and 1990s:
1. Parmalat has opted to invest in countries with more growth potential than Western Europe.
This led the firm to open a single factory in Brazil in 1974.  By 1995, Parmalat Brazil
operated 18 plants, employing 10,000 people and manufacturing more than 400 products.
By 1996, the company operated 84 plants around the world with total production of 4.5
million liters of milk per day.  In addition to its major presence in Brazil, the firm had plants
in Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, Chile, Spain, Portugal, Germany, France, Hungary,
Russia, the U.S., Australia, Mexico, and China.
2. Debt has been the major source of funding for Parmalat's acquisitions.  The firm has been
reluctant to raise additional equity capital because this would dilute the 51% stake of the
Tanzi family in the firm.
3. Parmalat seeks to transform the firm from a commodity food company into a nutrition
company, offering functional foods that have special health benefits [69].  Examples include
UHT milk enriched with seven vitamins.  The goal is to increase value-added sales from
35% to 50% of the total sales by 2004.
4. The firm's R&D capability is being expanded to support the increased sales of functional
foods and other differentiated dairy products.
5. In developing countries the firm will use commodity dairy products to generate cash and
provide a distribution platform.  As incomes increase in these countries, Parmalat will push
higher value-added products through the same channels, build strong brand awareness for
the firm's products, and ultimately introduce a range of value-added products.
Unilever
·  BACKGROUND.  Unilever was founded in 1930 by the merger of Margarine Unie of the
Netherlands and Lever Brothers of the United Kingdom.  The company had sales of U.S.$43.8
billion in 2000.  This figure reflects sales gained by acquisitions in 2000 of U.S. firms Best
Foods for U.S.$20.3 billion, Ben & Jerry's Homemade for U.S.$326 million, and Slimfast for
U.S.$2.3 billion.  The acquisitions pushed the firm to a strong second place to Nestle in sales.
While the employment figures undoubtedly have shrunk in the past year as a result of
rationalization measures, the firm had about 250,000 employees in 88 countries in 2000 [9].
Effective in January 2001, the company consolidated operations into two global divisions: The
Foods Division and the Home and Personal Care Division.  Unilever has a host of brands, the
most well-known of which include: Magnum ice cream, Ben & Jerry's ice cream, Lipton Tea,
Wish-Bone salad dressing, Flora margarine, Hellmann's mayonnaise, Knorr soups, Skippy
peanut butter, Dove soaps, and hundreds of lesser-known brands.  Because of competitive
advantages the firm developed in the logistics of handling frozen products, Unilever became the
world's largest ice cream company and achieved strong market positions in other frozen foods.
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During the 1990s, Unilever's annual sales growth averaged about 2%, trailing the company's 5%
target.  Competitor Proctor & Gamble had annual sales growth in this period of 4.9%, while
Nestle recorded growth of 3.1% in the 1990s [9].
·  EARLY STRATEGIES.
1. The two companies that formed Unilever established a tradition of expanding their
businesses through both exports and local production [34].
2. Starting with the Indian subsidiary in 1942, Unilever put into place a management process
that company insiders refer to as "ization" [34, p.48].  Thus, filling local executive and
technical  positions  with  Indian managers led to the "Indianization" of that
subsidiary—along  with  "Brazilianization" and similar staffing in various other countries
with Unilever operations.
3. The company focused on two consistent and related practices to underpin structural
changes: recruitment of high-quality managers, and linking of decentralized units through a
common corporate culture.
4. In its corporate strategies aimed at maintaining and developing synergies, Unilever has
shifted from a predominantly portfolio concept toward a transferring skills concept and even
a sharing of activities concept [33, p.41].
·  STRATEGIES OF THE LATE 1990s AND EARLY 2000s.  
1. In 1999 and 2000, the firm decided to focus on its 400 top-performing brands, which
accounted for about 86% of the firm's sales.  The company's 1,600 lesser brands may not
be eliminated, but will be allowed to "wither on the vine" [9].
2. High  growth  brands in core categories will be added to the firm's portfolio.  Major
components of the Best Foods acquisition are consistent with the strategy described in
Point 1.
3. A series of linked initiatives (including the 400-brand strategy) were unveiled to align the
entire company behind growth ambitions—including expansion of e-business—to increase
annual growth in revenues to 5%-6% and operating margins to 16% by 2004 [2].
4. The company's supply chain will be simplified to produce a billion British pounds in
savings annually by cutting the number of suppliers and eliminating needless variations in
ingredients [26].
5. Product "tinkering" at the local level is being reduced.  For example, Magnum ice cream
bars now have a uniform name, logo, and packaging globally and flavors vary only slightly
by country [9].
6. Early in 2000, Unilever realigned its top management structure into two operating units to
accelerate decision making and tighten control of marketing strategies.
7. Products that save the consumer time will be incorporated into the "bloodstream" of the
business.
8. To increase efficiencies, the firm identified 8,000 jobs that will be eliminated and 100 plants
that will be closed as part of a plan to reduce the company's workforce by 10% [42].
Summary of Foreign Direct Investment Strategies of Case Firms
What generalizations can be drawn from the strategies of these firms that U.S. investors in
foreign dairy-food firms might find noteworthy and possibly worth emulating?
All Have Expanded
In pursuit of profits, all the case firms have expanded in size and, in the process, contributed to
industry consolidation.  The main reasons given by the firms for expanding include those in
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Table 4. Reasons Given for Expansion by the Case Firms
Reason Firm(s) Specifying Reason
To gain market power to countervail the growing
power of supermarkets
All case firms
To achieve the large size required to obtain economies
of scale in R&D and brand development
NZDB-Global Dairy Company,
Kerry Group, Arla Foods, and Unilever
To gain profits associated with consolidating the still
fragmented global fluid milk business
Parmalat
To achieve benefits from geographic diversification to
include businesses with potentially rapid growth (and
high risk) in developing countries and slower growth
(and lower risk) markets in the developed world
Nestle
To obtain businesses that complement the firm's core
enterprises
Unilever
All Emphasize Product Differentiation
Not surprisingly, all the case firms emphasized product differentiation.  Undoubtedly, the firms
recognize Porter's notion that a firm can be a profitable processor and marketer of commodities if it
is a low cost producer [50].  However, with one partial exception, none the case firms emphasized a
low cost processor-commodity marketer strategy.  The partial exception emerged for the NZDB-
Global Dairy Company, which followed a two-pronged strategy, one component of which was low
cost production.  For the most part, however, the firms acted as if they attach credence to Warren
Buffett's comment that securities in companies selling commodity-like products should come with a
warning label that "competition may prove hazardous to human wealth [12]."
There is substantial variation in how the firms pursued product differentiation.  A few examples
will  suffice to show the variation.  As indicated earlier, the NZDB-Global Dairy Company
superimposes conventional product differentiation (brand development, etc.) on top of being
supplied by the world's lowest-cost milk producers.  The advantage of this combination is that the
benefits of the two strategies are additive.  While this practice is more important to the firm's dairy
exporting activities than to foreign direct investment in dairy-food businesses, it is strongly
applicable to the latter when dairy products of New Zealand origin are sold through the
organization's foreign subsidiaries.  
Kerry Cooperative (parent of Kerry Group/PLC) was concerned about a host of problems
associated with selling bulk and partially differentiated dairy products manufactured from milk
produced in Ireland.  The concerns emerged in part because milk purchased by Kerry Cooperative
was priced under the EU's quota-based Common Agricultural Policies and carried the baggage that
goes with quotas.  Partly because of these concerns the company diversified heavily into food
ingredients—many with nondairy components—and into branded food products.  As a result, only
about 11% of the firm's sales in the late 1990s originated from milk of Irish origin.
Unilever modified its brand strategy beginning in the late 1990s by pruning the firm's brands
with the objective of reducing the total from about 1,600 to 400.  The pruning will take place partly
by allowing minor brands to "wither on the vine."  Nestle does not prune brands as vigorously as
Unilever.  Indeed, Nestle has maintained literally thousands of brands, many of which are registered
in only one country.  Local brands have been useful to Nestle for expanding sales of the company's
products in developing countries.
“Ization” is Practiced by Unilever, Nestle, and Others
Unilever reports that the firm began to fill local executive and technical positions in the early
1940s through a process that company insiders refer to as "ization."  Thus, there was
"Indianization" of subsidiaries in India, Brazilianization of subsidiaries in Brazil, etc.  While Nestle
does not give the staffing of its foreign subsidiaries the same name, the firm follows staffingWhen Will U.S. Firms Become Major Dairy Exporters and Bigger Direct Investors in Foreign Dairy-Food Businesses?
Babcock Institute Discussion Paper No. 2001-3 23
practices somewhat similar to "ization" for its numerous foreign units.  While the "ization" process
is well established in Unilever, the firm has installed stronger central controls on local managers.
Other large case firms that practice variations of "ization"  are putting in place mechanisms to see
that good ideas relating to technology and marketing are shared across all units of the firm.
All are in Near-Constant Pursuit of Efficiencies
The publicly-held case firms, in particular, have pursued familiar cost-cutting measures that
involve plant closings, worker layoffs, and greater use of e-commerce.  Shareholders in the firms
undoubtedly demand such behavior.  The brand pruning strategy of Unilever is being done in part
to achieve greater efficiencies.  Nestle seeks to discover the root causes of competitive advantage for
the firm, a practice that often involves identifying efficiencies. The New Zealand Dairy Board-
Global Dairy Company is seeking to achieve greater efficiencies in processing, marketing and on-
farm milk production.  The greater on-farm production efficiencies are being sought to ensure that
the New Zealand dairy industry maintains arguably its greatest source of competitive
advantage—the lowest milk production costs in the world.
Unique Strategies of Individual Firms
Most case firms exhibit unique strategies that serve them well.  The cooperatives (i.e., Arla
Foods and the NZDB-Global Dairy Company) and cooperative public limited company (Kerry
Group) have pursued strategies that are especially noteworthy.
Arla Foods.  This firm has put in place strategies that have permitted the firm to:
·  Establish itself as one of the world's leading suppliers of value-added, milk-based
ingredients for selected segments of the food industry.  A manifestation of the strategy was
the joint venture entered into by Arla Foods and SanCor of Argentina to create the first
large-scale whey processing plant in Argentina.
·  Create a Key Account Management System to promote close cooperation with a few
multiples (supermarkets) as to product range, terms of delivery, logistics, and product
development.  This helps the firm to continue to be a preferred supplier of larger
supermarkets.
·  Remain nimble despite its large size.  This allows the firm to efficiently redirect sales
relatively quickly when market conditions change.
NZDB-Global Dairy Company.  The important strategy of superimposing product
differentiation on top of being supplied by the world's lowest-cost milk producers was noted earlier.
In addition, the firm recognized in a timely fashion the need to restructure the New Zealand dairy
industry's exporting-foreign direct investment mix to recognize limits on opportunities to expand
dairy exports.  On a related point, New Zealand's dairy industry recognized that it had outgrown the
need for the NZDB to serve as a monopoly exporter.  Hence, the NZDB will merge with the two
large cooperatives that dominate New Zealand's dairy industry, and within about a year is expected
to relinquish its monopoly exporting privilege.
Kerry  Group/PLC.  This firm's diversification into food ingredients and product
differentiation strategies served the organization well after it found itself placed in an untenable
position by a 20% loss of milk supply and an unfavorable market environment for its major
products.  While the cooperative was innovative in converting itself into a cooperative public limited
company to raise capital needed for acquiring foreign firms, this probably was not the firm's most
important strategic move.  The more important measure was its ability to keep superior, insightful
management in the employ of the firm for a generation.
Strategies of Other Case Firms
Other case firms pursued unique strategies that are more difficult to categorize.  A few
noteworthy strategies that relate specifically to foreign direct investment in dairy-food business
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Parmalat.   This firm developed proficiency in tapping capital markets that permitted the
company to successfully finance a host of major dairy acquisitions in the 1980s and 1990s.
Secondly, the firm has adopted strategies that made it a world leader in UHT milk.  This capacity
has proven particularly useful to Parmalat for expanding fluid milk sales in developing countries.
Finally, the firm is partially transforming itself from a producer of partially differentiated dairy
products into a "nutrition company" that will produce functional foods that satisfy consumer
groups with new products that have special health characteristics.
Kraft  Foods.  This firm's successes probably reflect the impact of generally superior
management rather than pursuit of any particular strategy.  But unwavering pursuit of product
differentiation is a strategy that has produced superior results for the firm.  For example, Kraft
Foods North America purchases the majority of its cheese from other firms for further processing
rather than processing cheese from raw milk.  This has permitted the firm to focus on the value-
added segment of the cheese business and use the firm's marketing prowess to advantage.
Nestle.  Firms such as the NZDB-Global Dairy Company point to Nestle as the model to be
emulated in international markets for highly differentiated products.  The balance the firm maintains
between developed and developing country sales, its use of variations of an "ization" staffing
strategy, and a bundle of other strategies have served the firm well.  The firm employs a goal of real
4% internal growth as an important benchmark for the firm's employees.  Nestle's CEO described
the importance of the benchmark as follows: "I've done it (established the 4% benchmark) for
Nestle's employees.  If all I wanted was growth, I could do that myself with a banker and a
negotiator, through acquisitions [74, p. 117]."  This comment about ways of attaining growth
appears to reflect some disdain on the part of Nestle for growth through acquisitions—an attitude
that contrasts sharply with that of several other case firms.
Unilever.  Unilever is a company in transition.  The firm recently emphasized acquisitions
(Best Foods, Ben & Jerry's Homemade, and Slimfast), efficiency measures, and core brands that
the firm hopes will lift the firm into the top tier of larger international food firms in terms of
profitability.  It has also adopted the forward-looking strategy of incorporating products into the
"bloodstream" of the business that save the consumer time.  The jury is still out on whether these
strategies will produce the results sought by the company.
Implications for Foreign Direct Investment in Dairy-Food Businesses by U.S. Firms
The case firms have, for the most part, adjusted well to the distinctive conditions in which they
found themselves.  Nestle's geographic diversification decisions, which took the firm into the
growth markets of Asia and Latin America reflect, in part, the belief that U.S. and Western
European dairy-food markets are "flat and fiercely competitive."  This diversification decision by a
model firm has implications for U.S. firms.  Maybe the implication is as simple as "if Nestle is
doing it, maybe there are profits in it."
The  NZDB-Global Dairy Company's decision to emphasize foreign direct investment that
produces dairy products using milk produced in the country where the foreign direct investment has
been made, speaks volumes about how this largest of the specialized, private dairy exporters views
prospects for expanded dairy exports.  The implications to be drawn might be similar to those
generated by Nestle's behavior.  In addition, the NZDB-Global Dairy Company is likely to provide
strong competition for U.S. firms in foreign markets where U.S. direct investments might be made.
While Nestle and the NZDB-Global Dairy Company are models for other firms to emulate, the
decisions of MD Foods and Arla Cooperative also warrant the attention of U.S. dairy cooperatives.
MD Foods and Arla Cooperative appear to have done many things correctly.  The two firms gave
strong attention to strategic fit as they contemplated the merger.  Arla Cooperative, for example,
lacked the international sales network possessed by MD Foods.  Now the merged organization has
the international sales capabilities, a larger milk supply, and expanded R&D capability.  The Arla
Foods joint venture with SanCor in Argentina promises to make Arla-SanCor a strong competitor
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Parmalat's view that the global fluid milk business is fragmented and ripe for profitable further
consolidation guided that company's acquisition binge in the 1990s.  If correct, Parmalat's view of
the world has implications for the new Dean Foods Company (Suiza-Dean combination).
Presumably, the new Dean Foods will seek to further consolidate processing and marketing of fluid
milk in the U.S., and perhaps extend the firm's operations more fully into the international arena.
Mexico and Canada will be logical early geographic extensions.
One lesson for U.S. firms that might become more heavily involved in foreign direct investment
in dairy-food businesses does not relate heavily to strategy.  Upon reflection, the reader will
probably conclude that the case firms, for the most part, have merely responded thoughtfully to the
situations in which they found themselves.  Thoughtful responses, however, are not foreordained.
The successful responses have occurred substantially because the firms have assembled and kept
superior management for extended periods.  Given their resources, it is perhaps no surprise that the
large, publicly held firms (Nestle, Unilever, Kraft Foods) could keep such a stable of managers, but
the cooperative case firms also pursued practices that allowed them to retain strong managers.
The "Bottom Line" for U.S. Foreign Direct Investment
Of course, the summary points and implications do not fully answer the question relating to
when U.S. firms will become bigger foreign direct investors in dairy food businesses.  They merely
say a little about what it might take for additional U.S. firms to become successful foreign direct
investors in these businesses.  However, few key points have emerged:
·  Most of the case firms expanded direct investments in foreign markets partly because of
constraints in the home country.  The European-based firms and the NZDB-Global Dairy
Company are all located in countries where the size and growth prospects for the home country
market are limited.  U.S. firms face no comparable constraint.  Hence, they lack incentives as
strong as those of the New Zealand and European firms to engage in foreign direct investment
in dairy-food businesses.
·  Several  European case firms had strong brands that cried out for expansion.  With the
exception of Kraft Foods, few, if any, U.S. dairy firms have brands as strong as those of several
European firms.  Hence, the incentives of U.S. firms to foster brand expansion by engaging in
foreign direct investment in dairy-food businesses are lower than those facing some European
firms.
·  Foreign direct investment in dairy-food businesses indeed may be somewhat of a "big firm's
game."  The successful firms analyzed were all multi-billion dollar firms and capitalized on the
advantages associated with large size.  The consolidation that is taking place in the U.S. dairy
processing and marketing business should increase the ability of selected U.S. firms to compete
effectively in this environment.
·  If, as claimed by the former CEO of Nestle, much of the U.S. dairy-food market is "flat and
fiercely competitive," this will provide incentives for U.S. firms to consider additional foreign
direct investment in dairy-food businesses.  Whether a U.S. firm should engage in foreign
direct investment is, of course, a complex question that must be based on a firm's individual
circumstances and capabilities.  The decision also should take into account a firm's desire to
gain early-mover advantages.  But, unlike the situation for dairy exporting—where price
supports and border protection price many U.S. dairy products out of world markets—the
barriers to foreign direct investment are less daunting.  The prevalence of foreign direct
investment by a diverse cross section of firms suggests something about how feasible it is to do
successfully.When Will U.S. Firms Become Major Dairy Exporters and Bigger Direct Investors in Foreign Dairy-Food Businesses?
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